Future of Innovation in Medicine: Incentives for New Medical Treatments and Global Health by Jacob, Robin
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts
Volume 12
Issue 3 Innovation in Medicine Symposium Article 2
2-1-2017
Future of Innovation in Medicine: Incentives for
New Medical Treatments and Global Health
Robin Jacob
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Food and Drug Law Commons, and the
Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact cnyberg@uw.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robin Jacob, Future of Innovation in Medicine: Incentives for New Medical Treatments and Global Health, 12 Wash. J. L. Tech. & Arts
211 (2017).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol12/iss3/2
WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS 
VOLUME 12, ISSUE 3 SYMPOSIUM 2017 
 
FUTURE OF INNOVATION IN MEDICINE: INCENTIVES FOR 
NEW MEDICAL TREATMENTS AND GLOBAL HEALTH 
 
The Right Honorable Professor Sir Robin Jacob* 
© The Right Honorable Professor Sir Robin Jacob 
 
CITE AS: R JACOB, WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 211 (2017) 
http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/handle/1773.1/1735 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Future of Innovation in Medicine Conference 
(“Conference”) proceedings contained in this Symposium 
Issue are about the problem of incentivizing research into 
new uses for established medicines. Putting the problem into 
the wider context of financing pharma research generally 
gives an important perspective.   
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I. THE PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH MODEL 
 
A.  Who Pays for Pharmaceutical Research Today 
 
For many years, and still today, the brunt – the heavy lifting – of 
research and development (“R&D”) of pharmaceuticals has been 
carried out by the pharmaceutical industry or rather that section of 
it which consists of very large, research-based companies, often 
called “big pharma.”   My research assistant did a rough and ready 
internet search on R&D spending in 2014. For the top 30 companies 
the figures was $120 billion; for governments and charities (notably 
the Gates and Welcome Foundations) the figure is $30 billion.   I am 
sure more precise figures can be obtained.  They do not matter for 
present purposes.   The $120 billion come from the gross profits that 
big pharma currently makes.   Those profits largely come from 
medicines which have some form of legal monopoly.  – A patent (or 
something like it such as a supplementary protection certificate, or 
regulatory exclusivity).  This because, as soon as exclusivity is lost, 
generic competition starts, prices and profits from the medicine 
concerned fall rapidly.   So, it is sales of the medicines which are 
subject to exclusivity which form the major contributor to the profits 
from which the $120 billion comes.     
Putting this in homely terms it works out that about 20% of the 
price in a high price country (the US, most of Europe and similar) 
of a widely prescribed patented medicine will be spent on R&D. 
The take home point is simple:  it is the patented medicines of 
today which pay for the research for the medicines of tomorrow. 
Governments and charities can and do a lot less by comparison – 
most particularly they simply do not have the resources for the huge 
cost of regulatory compliance. Of course, big pharma makes profits 
– and good ones too if things are going well.   But investment in 
pharma is risk money. For instance, if R&D now and of the next few 
produces little or nothing, the company will be staring at failure. 
Indeed, without new produces, any research-based pharma company 
will be reduced to a commodity, generic, company in about 12 years.   
By then exclusivity in all of a company’s products will be gone. 
True, it is that a lot of money is also spent on “promotion.”   But 
most of this is really about educating doctors – and they are no 
longer getting the great perks of yesteryears.  Only in the US is 
2
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol12/iss3/2
2017] FUTURE OF INNOVATION IN MEDICINE 213 
 
consumer advertising allowed – an obviously silly practice to an 
outsider! 
 
B.  Current Problems 
 
There are a number of factors which increasingly threaten the 
current, longstanding, industry model: 
First. The discovery of new medicines is becoming rare. Perhaps 
this is because in the past the industry previously gathered low-
hanging fruit which is now exhausted. But now for whatever reason, 
the stream of new “blockbuster” medicines coming on the market, 
if not running dry, is flowing less abundantly.  
Second. The period of practical (i.e. from first marketing to 
expiry of patent plus Supplementary Protection Certificate or 
“SCP”) new drug exclusivity is falling.    A piece of research which 
will be published shortly by Tony Rollins shows that the time taken 
for regulatory approval has grown so much that the combined period 
of effective exclusivity provided by a drug patent and a follow up 
Supplementary Protection Certificate is now about the same as the 
period of effective exclusivity before the SPC system came into 
operation in Europe. That period was thought to be too short (hence 
the SPC system). It very probably is too short again, yet it is very 
doubtful that the legislators anywhere will provide a longer period 
of exclusivity.  Whether the increased time for regulatory approval 
can be brought down I do not know – it certainly needs looking at.  
Perhaps in some cases regulation is over-precautionary. 
Third. The pricing of medicines which actually cure is becoming 
increasingly problematic.   Many of the “blockbusters” of the past, 
e.g. the statins, require daily doses for life. The price of an individual 
dose, albeit quite a bit greater than manufacturing cost, does not 
sound too high.   But if a medicine cures – perhaps with only a few 
doses - the size of the market is much smaller. Yet the cost of 
ongoing research and regulatory compliance remains the same.    So 
how much for a pill or injection that cures a serious disease? There 
was huge row with politicians crying “the sick cannot afford this” 
about Gilead’s price of nearly $100,000 for sovaldi.  It is used for a 
12-week treatment period which cures (not alleviates) the most 
common form of hepatitis C.  In the broader context, such a cost is 
actuallycheap compared with the alternative – years of various 
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treatments and patients who, because of their illness, are drains on 
both society and their families.  Some of the new immunotherapy 
cancer treatments will fall into the same box.   No matter that a few 
injections may make expensive surgery, radiotherapy and 
chemotherapy unnecessary, there will be loud voices complaining 
about prices and the wicked drug companies. We are in a strange 
world where the better and quicker a medicine cures, the more 
people complain about its price. 
Fourth. Individualized treatment – personal medicine – is 
becoming increasingly important. Diagnosis is becoming more and 
more patient specific, and doctors are more and more becoming able 
to predict whether a particular drug will work for a particular patient.   
Blanket, scattergun, mass prescribing is going to fall.  Medically, 
that is most welcome – no-one wants to give or take a medicine 
which does not in fact help the specific patient. But a fall in mass 
prescriptions also means less sales, – again reducing pharma’s 
income unless prices are put up correspondingly.  
 The upshot is that there are real risks to the current 
commercial incentives to do R&D. 
 
C.  The Practical Effect of Exclusivity for Research 
 
The hard commercial truth is simple – it is legal exclusivity 
which allows the makers to charge a high price. It is high prices 
which pay for ongoing R&D. It is the prospect of those high prices 
which is the key driver for the spending of that $120 billion on new 
medicine R&D. Without that prospect, how could the CEOs of 
pharmaceutical research-based companies justify their 
expenditures?    
 
D.  What Happens if Exclusivity for a Possible Research 
Candidate is Not Possible, or Would be Weak or Too Short? 
 
The answer is both obvious and inevitable. Commercial 
investment in R&D for these candidates is, at best, unlikely.  But 
more likely will not happen.   We see the effects of this now.  Thus, 
there is the much reduced level of big pharma research for new 
antibiotics. Antibiotics are cures or largely so. Also, widespread 
sales of antibiotics are not as likely as they were in the past because, 
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rightly, of the concern that bacteria will develop resistance. 
Government leaders wring their hands – but do not promise an 
extended period of exclusivity. 
 
II. NEW USES FOR ESTABLISHED MEDICINES 
 
Medical history is littered with examples of new uses for known 
drugs providing substantial advances in the treatment of patients.  
For example, rapamycin was first used as an anti-fungal agent but 
was subsequently discovered to be a powerful immunosuppressant; 
allopurinol was first used in the treatment of gout but was 
subsequently found to be effective as an anti-neoplastic agent; 
zoledronic acid was first used in the treatment of tumour-induced 
hypercalcemia and later found to be effective against osteoporosis; 
and finasteride was first used in the treatment of prostate disorders 
but was subsequently discovered to be effective in the treatment of 
alopecia.  Furthermore, if you think about it, it does not seem 
probable that the first medical use of a new substance will be its only 
medical use.  We even see frequent reports in the ordinary press of 
possible beneficial side effects of established medicines.  Often they 
sound very hopeful – a recent one was a possibility that a drug for a 
type of leukemia may even reverse Parkinson’s.   Few of these 
possibilities are followed up. 
The cost of developing a new indication for a known drug is 
substantial, although not generally as high as the cost of developing 
a new drug.  In particular, the drug having been developed for the 
earlier indication there is no or much less need to investigate safety.   
But there is a need for expensive clinical trials in large groups of 
patients (Phase III trials) to be carried out before marketing approval 
can be obtained for the new indication.  Such trials are very 
expensive. Maybe the costs of development of an established 
medicine are one third to a half of the cost of development of a 
totally new medicine.  Again, precise numbers do not matter 
So, what are the current incentives for this type of research?   In 
many cases the answer is none or little.  Speakers at the Conference 
examined: 1) patent protection and 2) regulatory exclusivity. 
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A.  Patent Protection 
 
That which is old or obvious cannot be patentable.  Often the 
first disclosure of a possible valuable further use is before any 
possible patent application can be filed. For instance, a treating team 
of doctors talking about the possible new use at a medical 
conference or in a short letter to the Lancet or the like. There are 
also risks associated with prior disclosure during the course of a 
clinical evaluation of a possible new use, yet such trials may be 
necessary to justify a patent.  If any of these prior disclosures occur, 
the patent route is foreclosed.    
 
B.  Regulatory Exclusivity 
 
(a)  Patent protection?   That which is old or obvious cannot be 
patentable.  Very often the first disclosure of a possible valuable 
further use is before any possible patent, for instance by, a treating 
team of doctors talking about the possible new use at a medical 
conference or in a short letter to the Lancet or the like.   And there 
are of course risks of prior disclosure during the course of a clinical 
evaluation of a possible new use.   Yet such trials may be necessary 
to justify a patent.1  If any of these prior disclosures happen the 
patent route is foreclosed.    
Even if patent protection is available it is necessarily limited in 
effectiveness as discussed in detail at the conference. 
(b) Regulatory exclusivity?  This may arise because some 
important jurisdictions do not allow a generic company to sell a 
product for product for a particular use without providing data to 
support that use.  And for a period of time the generic company is 
not permitted to rely on the data of the originator.  During that time, 
since it will not have data of its own, it cannot sell with an indication 
of the new use.  But it can sell with the data for the old use. 
The Conference examines in detail the controversial and 
complicated way in which both patent and regulatory protection for 
new uses of established medicines work in practice.  Particularly, it 
examines the “skinny label” problem, where a generic company 
sells an established medicine only with the information about the 
established use but doctors prescribe, or pharmacists supply, the 
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medicine for the new use.  If there is patent or regulatory protection, 
is anyone liable?  Should or could the payers (the NHS in the UK, 
insurance companies in most countries) be made to pay a premium 
for the actual new use to which the product is put? And how 
prevalent, effective, or safe is “off-label” prescribing anyway?     
At its end, the Conference considers what, if anything, can be 
done to provide an adequate incentive for research into new uses for 
established medicines, and what can be done to facilitate such 
research.  Can or should prescriptions include the intended use.  
Would that not only encourage such research but facilitate it from 
the data which would be generated?     
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